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Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust
Policy
HERBERT HOVENKAMP †
ERIK HOVENKAMP ††
INTRODUCTION
A bundled discount occurs when a seller conditions a
discount or rebate on the buyer’s purchase of two or more
different products from that seller. 1 Bundled discounts come
in many varieties. For example, the seller might offer a 10%
discount to a buyer who takes product A from the buyer,
provided that the buyer purchases product B as well. The
seller might offer the discount on each purchase of one unit
of A, provided that it is accompanied by one unit of B.
Alternatively, it might condition the discount or rebate on
purchases of both A and B, but without specifying the
proportion, leaving the customer to determine its needs for
the two products. It might do this by stipulating a “market
share” percentage rather than a requirement of all
purchases. For example, it might provide for a 10% discount
to buyers who agree to take at least 70% of their needs of
both A and B from the seller, but without specifying the
percentage of each. Or it might do the same thing but with
three, four or even a dozen products rather than two. The
terms can vary widely, but the most obvious variables are
(1) the number of goods in the bundle; (2) the proportion of
the goods in the bundle, and whether the proportion is
specified in an any sense or left completely up to the
customer; and (3) the percentage share of its needs that the
customer must purchase from the seller in order to obtain
the discount.

† Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
†† Undergraduate, Economics and Mathematics, University of Iowa.
1. Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled
Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL.
517, 517 (2008); see also 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749 (3d ed. 2008).
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Here we consider “complex bundles,” or bundles that
include more than two goods, or more than one unit of at
least one bundled good, or that permit the customer to
determine the proportion of the various goods in the bundle
that it purchases. Such complex bundling is a common
practice and can be found, for example, in markets for
medical supplies or devices brokered by Group Purchasing
Organizations (GPOs) and sold from the device
manufacturers to health care providers such as hospitals. 2
Indeed, the bundle that is most generally the subject of
study—one monopoly good and one competitive good—is a
relative rarity. The bundle at issue in the Ninth Circuit’s
important Cascade decision was also complex in this way.
There, the defendant gave a discount conditioned on the
buyers’ agreement to take a bundle of three products,
primary, secondary and tertiary medical care, from the
seller. 3 The proportion of services in each component of the
bundle was not known when the arrangement was created,
but was determined later by post-agreement patient
demand.
Bundled discounting is an exceedingly common practice
in commercial contracts involving suppliers of multiple
interrelated products. Unquestionably, a great majority of
such discounting practices are competitively harmless and
should be lawful. However, bundled discounts have one
characteristic that has brought them under antitrust
scrutiny: the discount must be “amortized” over the range of
products that the seller offers. If a rival producer sells some
subset but less than all the goods in the dominant firm’s
bundled discount offering, it will have a smaller range of
goods over which to amortize the discount. 4 As a result, the

2. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HEALTH INDUS. GROUP PURCHASING ASS’N,
GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATION (GPO) PURCHASING AGREEMENTS AND
ANTITRUST LAW (2004), http://www.higpa.org/pdf/2004HovenkampGPOsandAnt
itrustLaw.pdf.
3. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir.
2008); see also LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp. 2d 307, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580
n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001); Ortho
Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
4. See infra apps. 1-2.
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proportionate discount it needs to give on each product in
the bundle in order to capture the sale must be larger.
To illustrate, suppose that a dominant firm produces
goods A and B at a cost of $5 and $7, respectively. It sells
the two goods separately for $10 each per unit but offers a
20% discount to anyone who will take a bundle of one A
good and one B good. Note that this discounted price, $16, is
well above the firm’s costs, which are $12. However, a rival
sells only B, for which its production costs are also $7. If a
customer wants the rival’s B good it loses the discount from
the dominant firm on the A good. As a result, the customer
must pay $10 for the dominant firm’s A, and at least $7, the
cost price, for the rival firm’s B. The rival will be unable to
capture the sale of B even though it is equally efficient, in
the sense that its production costs for B are the same as
those faced by the dominant firm.
The important things about this illustration are, first,
that at all times the dominant firm is selling its goods above
cost. Even the fully discounted $16 price for the A-B bundle
is well above the firm’s $12 costs for producing the two
goods. Second, the rival is “equally efficient” in the sense
that it has the same costs for producing B that the
dominant firm has; it simply does not make good A. Third,
the practice is nevertheless “exclusionary” in the sense that
the rival cannot profitably compete with it, at least to those
customers who wish to purchase As and Bs together and in
equal amounts.
The practice thus has some, but not all, of the
characteristics of predatory pricing, which is condemned
only when the dominant firm’s overall price structure is
below a relevant measure of cost. 5 The practice is similar in
the sense that it is a pricing practice that is capable of
excluding an equally efficient rival, which is also a defining
characteristic of orthodox single-product predatory pricing
as the Supreme Court defined that practice in the Brooke
Group case. 6 Second, the practice is fully “sustainable” in
5. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007) (developing requirements of Sherman Act predatory pricing law under §
2, in case involving buyer alleged predation); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (developing requirements of
Sherman Act predatory pricing law under Robinson-Patman Act); see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 720-21.
6. On the equally efficient rival test for monopolistic pricing practices
generally, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 651b2. On the test as
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the sense that the dominant firm’s prices are always above
its costs. Indeed, in our example the fully discounted price is
25% above the dominant firm’s costs, a situation that one
would not find even presumptively suspicious.
Third, because the price is profitable it likely has a
perfectly good explanation that has nothing to do with the
suppression of competition: the price might be profitable
because the dominant firm sells more units of output at the
20% bundled discount than it does when it charges the
higher separate prices for the two products. That is to say,
the practice can be fully profitable for the dominant firm
without regard to its impact on competition. And indeed,
that has to be the case because bundled discount pricing is
commonly used even in highly competitive markets where
exclusion of rivals is not generally possible. For example, a
high school basketball team might sell a season ticket with
ten games at a lower price than the sum of ten individual
game tickets. Or a restaurant in Manhattan might offer a
prix fixe dinner that includes five courses at a lower price
than the individual menu price of the five items.
Destruction of rivals cannot be the explanation for these
pricing practices in these markets.
In these two examples exclusion of an equally efficient
rival is probably not a possibility because it is so easy for a
rival high school basketball team to combine its events into
a single season ticket, and just as easy for a rival restaurant
to combine its courses and offer a lower bundled price. To
the extent that a competitive problem arises, it must be
because the rival firm is unable, at least in the short term,
to match the dominant firm’s combination. What the
antitrust cases involving bundled discounts 7 have in
common is that the rival makes only a subset of the goods in
the bundle and cannot readily add in the extra goods that
would enable it to produce the full range. Nor can it readily
form joint ventures with others, which would have the same
effect. 8
used in bundled discount cases see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at
520-34, and Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer
Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423, 447-62 (2006).
7. See decisions cited supra note 3.
8. On this point, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28. See
also Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688
(2005).
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Much of the recent case law and commentary on
bundled discounts has dealt with the formulation of costbased tests for determining when a bundled discount is
“exclusionary” in the sense that it keeps rivals out of the
market. In order to have antitrust significance a bundle
must not merely keep one rival out of the market; it must
exclude all of them. That is to say, a firm’s aggregate
discount of product A, B, and C might very well exclude a
rival who produces only B and C, but not A. However, if
there are other rivals in the market who also make the full
range of A, B, and C, then the practice is not exclusionary,
although it may limit the range of effective competition to
those firms capable of competing across the full range of
goods.
The term “bundle-to-bundle” discount competition refers
to competition among two or more firms that offer the full
range of goods in the bundle. 9 In general, if bundle-tobundle discount competition can occur in a market, then a
particular firm’s bundled discount cannot be exclusionary
unless its overall price is below its costs. Otherwise an
equally efficient firm exists that would be able to match the
discounted price and earn a profit. 10 Further, the other rival
need not offer the defendant’s full product line. If two or
more competitors collectively produce the entire contents of
the bundle, they will be able to match the dominant firm’s
pricing. 11 However, this result may not hold if the bundling
firm observes significant cost savings as a result of
producing the bundle’s entire contents simultaneously (e.g.,
joint cost savings, scope economies). In that case, rivals who
produce only a subset of the bundle may not be able to
attain those savings. As a result, the dominant firm’s price,
while above its own costs, may be too low for any coalition of
rivals to compete with it.
When the fully discounted price of a dominant firm’s
bundle is above cost, the most obvious explanation for the
9. See, e.g., Barry Nalebuff, Competing Against Bundles, in INCENTIVES,
ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 327-28 (Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D.
Myles eds., 2000).
10. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at ¶ 749b; Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 524-25; see also Timothy J. Muris & Vernon L.
Smith, Antitrust and Bundled Discounts: An Experimental Analysis, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 399, 428 (2008).
11. See infra text accompanying note 28.
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bundle is that it results in more sales—such as the prix fixe
menu in a highly competitive restaurant market. Further,
this is likely to be the case even if rivals do not produce all
bundled goods and cannot match the discount. As a result, a
bundled discount practice might be “exclusionary” in the
sense that rivals cannot match the bundled price, but the
practice still does not warrant condemnation because it is
fully justified by the dominant firm’s attempts to increase
its own output. We reserve the term “predatory” for bundled
discount practices that are profitable only because they are
able to exclude equally efficient rivals and create or sustain
a monopoly. In sum, a bundle is exclusionary if it would
force an equally efficient rival to price below cost in order to
compete with it. 12 A bundle is predatory if it is profitable
only if one or more rivals are excluded.
Every predatory bundle is exclusionary, while
presumably very few exclusionary bundles are predatory.
This suggests that a test for whether a bundle is
exclusionary can offer safe harbor, but only that. If a
dominant firm’s bundled discount passes this test then no
further investigation into its discount practice is warranted;
the practice does not exclude in the antitrust sense.
However, if the dominant firm’s bundled price flunks this
test, then the bundle is “exclusionary” and further
investigation is warranted in order to determine whether it
is also predatory. The bundling strategy’s short run
profitability must be compared to its potential for harming
rivals, which can help determine whether it is
“unreasonably exclusionary,” or designed with only that
purpose in mind.
I. THE ATTRIBUTION TEST AS A SAFE HARBOR
In 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission
(AMC), a government created commission created to study
the antitrust laws and recommend improvements, 13
proposed the following test for unilaterally imposed
bundling when challenged as an exclusionary practice:
12. For our purposes, we will assume that to “compete with the bundle,” an
equally efficient rival must set a price such that consumers are indifferent
between buying the bundle and buying individually the goods that comprise it.
13. See Symposium, The Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST
BULL. 475 (2008).
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Courts should adopt a . . . test to determine whether bundled
discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To
prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be required to
show each one of the following elements (as well as other elements
of a Section 2 claim): (1) after allocating all discounts and rebates
attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive
product, the defendant sold the competitive product below its
incremental cost for the competitive product; . . . . 14

The Ninth Circuit, in the Cascade decision,
subsequently adopted a variation of this test, under which
one attributes the entire discount to the product upon which
exclusion is claimed (sometimes called the “competitive”
product). Then, if the resulting price of the competitive
product is lower than the defendant’s average variable
cost, 15 the test is failed, and the discount is deemed to be
“exclusionary” and may be unlawful in some cases.
Significantly, the cost portion of the AMC test is not a
test for anticompetitive effects as such: it simply asks the
question whether the bundle is structurally capable of
excluding some hypothetical rival who produces only a
subset of the goods in the bundle. How little the test shows
needs to be clear, because some regard it as a mantra for
anticompetitive pricing. 16 For example, suppose that
Manhattan has 1,000 restaurants that offer discounted prix
fixe menus that include wine, but that one of these 1,000
restaurants has lost its liquor license and as a result cannot
14. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99
(2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_re
port.pdf [hereinafter AMC REPORT]. The test went on to include two additional
elements: “(2) the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term losses; and (3)
the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse
effect on competition.” Id.
15. On the use of average variable cost as the number see Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 520-21. The Cascade decision explicitly adopted an
average variable cost test:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after
allocating the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of
products to the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the
competitive product or products below its average variable cost of
producing them.
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910 (9th Cir. 2008).
16. See generally Cascade, 515 F.3d at 900-02.
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include wine in the bundle. The bundled prices of the
remaining 999 restaurants might all flunk the attribution
test because the one restaurant without wine cannot match
the foregone wine discount in its own prix fixe menu
without running its prices below its costs. But the
restaurant market in Manhattan remains robustly
competitive.
Once a firm’s bundle flunks the attribution test, a full
analysis of market structure, competitive effects, and
rationales for the profitability of the defendant’s bundle
remain to be examined. Applied alone, the attribution test is
significantly over-deterrent, particularly when the firm
observes cost savings in production or distribution. For
example, a firm with joint costs distributed over A and B
will always be able to offer an A-B combination at a lower
price than could two different firms that each produce only
one of those goods, but match the bundling firm’s efficiency
in producing them individually. 17 Because joint costs can be
any relevant cost distributed over multiple goods, including
costs such as distribution, transportation, and order
processing, such cost-savings very likely explain the vast
majority of bundled discounting practices, including those
that flunk the attribution test.
In sum, the attribution test simply asks whether a
bundle is exclusionary. Any bundle that is not exclusionary
cannot be predatory. But the important question is not
whether a bundle can exclude, but whether it is predatory.
If the defendant can show that a bundling strategy does not
reduce short run profits, then immediate gains from
increased sales is the dominant explanation, and one cannot
show that the strategy is profitable only because it destroys
a rival. Suppose a monopolist in the market for good A
decides to sell a discounted bundle of goods A and B, where
B is sold in a moderately competitive market. As in the
previous illustration, assume that A and B are sold
individually for $10 each, while costs are $5 for A and $7 for
B. A rival firm produces only B. The monopolist then offers
a 20% discount on the bundle, yielding a bundled price of
$16. If there are no joint costs, the attribution test is
effective. It subtracts the nominal value of the discount ($4)
from the price of B. The result, which is $6, defines the
maximum price the rival can charge for a unit of B in order
17. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28; infra app. 2.
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to compete with the bundle (i.e., the price of B that reduces
the value of the bundle’s discount to zero). The example fails
the attribution test. Further, the given information does not
guarantee that total profits will not fall in the short run
before any exclusion occurs. As such, the bundle does not
presently warrant safe harbor, and so other evidence must
be considered before we can determine if the bundle is also
predatory. 18
However, if this example is modified to include joint
costs, the attribution test becomes overreaching and
ineffective. Suppose that there is a joint cost savings of $3
that results from the simultaneous production of A and B.
Hence, the cost of producing individual units is $5 for A and
$7 for B, as before, while the cost of producing both goods
simultaneously is $9. The monopolist again gives a 20%
discount, so that the price of the bundle is $16. To apply the
attribution test, the nominal value of the discount ($4) is
subtracted from the price of B (or, equivalently, the price of
A is subtracted from the bundle price), which leaves us with
$6. This amount is less than the cost of producing an
individual unit of B, so the attribution test is failed.
However, the incremental cost of producing the bundle (i.e.,
the cost of the bundle less the cost of A) is $4. Conversely,
the incremental price of selling B with A (i.e., the price of
the bundle less the price of A) is $6. Thus, the incremental
price of the bundle exceeds its incremental cost, so the
bundle yields a greater per-unit profit than an individual
unit of A. 19 Any consumers who switch from buying A to
buying the bundle will contribute more profits to the
bundling firm as a result.
This is strikingly different from the practice of
predatory bundling, which forfeits short-term profits in
order to exclude a rival, and which inevitably harms
consumers in a later period of recoupment. Rather, what the
bundling firm has effectively done is pass its efficiency gains
on to consumers, while still increasing short term profits.
18. For example, if output increased significantly in response to the discount,
the dominant firm might sell many more units at the bundled discount price,
earning $4 more in profits on each bundle than it earns by selling the units
separately and earning $8 in profits on each sale of an A + B pair. On the other
hand, if output did not increase that significantly, then there must be some
other explanation for the bundled discount’s profitability.
19. In the preceding case of no joint costs, the profits earned by selling the
bundle were strictly less than those earned by selling A individually.
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Moreover, these efficiency gains leave the bundle with a
significantly larger profit margin, so that it could easily
afford to slash prices further if its goal were to exclude a
rival. Indeed, the bundling firm in our example could price
the bundle at $9.50, which would be above cost, yet could
not be matched by a rival at any price—let alone a
sustainable one. So, while this bundle is indeed
exclusionary, it is clearly not the sort of bundled discount
that merits antitrust intervention. As this example shows,
there can be many applications of discounted bundling that
are pro-competitive and welfare-increasing, despite having
an adverse impact on a rival.
With some minor adjustments, the attribution test can
be modified so that it yields the correct outcomes, even in
the presence of joint costs. 20 The improved test, called the
“Incremental Cost Test” (ICT), works by offering safe harbor
to any bundle whose incremental price (over the primary
good) is at least as great as its incremental cost. The ICT is
based on the assumption that total profits will not fall if the
bundled sales are at least as profitable as individual sales of
the primary good. 21 Such would imply the bundling strategy
is profitable regardless of its impact on rivals, indicating
that the bundle is not predatory. As an example of this
improved test, suppose that a dominant firm prices A and B
separately at $10 each, but prices them together in a bundle
for $16. In that case, the ICT queries whether the $6
increase in price when good B is added into the bundle is
sufficient to cover B’s incremental cost. If the answer is yes,
then the bundle passes the ICT and offers a safe harbor.
Unlike the AMC’s attribution test, this test takes joint costs
into account.
One implication of the improvements gained through
the ICT is that the concept of an “equally efficient rival” has
limited significance when rivals do not produce every good
in the bundle. The condition of “equal efficiency” normally
takes a firm as it is found and looks at all relevant costs.
For example, suppose that individual production costs of A
and B are $5 and $7, respectively, but that producing them
together costs only $9. To call a firm an equally efficient
rival simply because it produces B alone at a cost of $7 is
inaccurate—the firm would reduce its costs by adding in
20. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 525-28.
21. For an explanation of this assumption, see infra app. 3.
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product A and attaining the joint cost savings as well. In
principle, that is no different from observing that, in the
presence of scale economies, a firm making 100 units per
month might reduce its per-unit costs by increasing output
to 200 units. In that case, the 100 unit firm is less efficient
than the 200 unit firm. In one situation, the firm reduces its
costs by making more of the same product; in the other, it
reduces its costs by adding in an additional product subject
to joint production costs. Indeed, if the monopolist sells only
the bundle and individual units of good A, and if joint cost
savings are observed, then the monopolist has no units of
output with production technologies comparable to those of
rival producers of B. That is, there is no production process
at which the monopolist and a B-market rival could be
equally efficient. Rather, the joint cost savings make the
technology used for producing individual units of B
fundamentally different from that used for creating the
bundle, and the idea of “equal efficiency” loses most of its
meaning.
A bundle is predatory (not merely exclusionary) only if
its ability to maintain or increase total profits requires the
exclusion of one or more rivals. Hence, a pass of the ICT
guarantees that the bundle is not predatory, though it may
be exclusionary in the presence of joint costs. This is
because the ICT simply asks whether the per-unit profits
achieved by the bundle are as great as those achieved by
individual sales of A. If the bundled discount simply passes
on a discount that is no greater than the joint cost savings,
then per unit profitability on the bundle will be at least as
high as profits earned on the primary component of the
bundle. Such a bundle cannot be predatory, for it is
profitable even when no rivals are excluded. This result
illustrates the real difference between the attribution test
and the incremental cost test. Namely, the attribution test
asks whether a bundle is exclusionary, while the ICT goes
further to ask whether it is potentially predatory. Of course,
many bundles that are potentially predatory (i.e., many that
fail the ICT) are pro-competitive, but these tests are only
designed to provide safe harbor; they cannot be used to
identify an unlawful bundle outright.
II. COMPLEX BUNDLES
The competitive effects of bundled discounts are more
difficult to assess when we consider bundles that are more
complex than simply 1 unit of product A and 1 unit of
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product B. In general, taking prices as given, a bundle is
defined by (i) a set of bundled goods; (ii) a set of bundled
quantities or proportions; and (iii) a discount factor.
Complex bundling occurs when the set of bundled goods is
greater than 2, when the bundled quantities of one or more
goods exceed 1, or when the proportions of the goods can be
varied. A bundle may not contain 2 products, only 3 or
more, and the additional products may or may not be
produced by the rival(s), or one secondary product might be
produced by one rival while another is produced by a
different rival. Fortunately, the principles that apply to
bundled pairs of goods also apply to complex bundles.
However, if the number of goods within a bundle changes or
the quantities of each good are changed, then the bundle’s
impact on rivals may change as well. Indeed, as this section
will illustrate, the competitive effects of similar-appearing
bundles can, in fact, be strikingly different.
The analysis that follows focuses on two situations:
first, bundles that contain more than 2 products and second,
bundles that contain multiple units of 1 or more bundled
goods where the customer is entitled to vary the proportions
of the goods in the bundle.
A. Bundles with More than Two Products
Bundling introduces a new element of competition into
the markets of each bundled good. We consider firms in
these markets to be rivals, despite the fact that they may
produce only a subset of those goods within the bundle. This
sort of pricing affects different rivals in different ways,
depending on which bundled goods they can produce, as
well as the combinations of goods that customers purchase.
We can use much of the same reasoning to analyze large
bundles as is applied in the simple case of bundled pairs.
Significantly, a bundle encompassing many different goods
and quantities can still be considered as a union of two
parts with opposing competitive effects, just as A and B in a
bundled pair. However, when bundles include more than
two different goods, these opposing parts are perceived
differently by different rivals, depending on which parts
they offer. For example, suppose a dominant firm offers a
bundle of the three goods, A, B, and C, where A is produced
exclusively by the bundling firm. Assume that rival 1
produces only B, while rival 2 produces only C. Rival 1
perceives good C no differently from good A, though good C

2009]

COMPLEX BUNDLES

1239

is in fact sold by both the dominant firm and rival 2. By
contrast, rival 2 does not perceive good C in this way, but
rather perceives good B as a second monopoly good. As a
result, discussion of a given bundle must be relativized to a
particular rival before we can understand how that rival
stands to be affected.
Building on the previous example, 22 suppose that a
bundle contains exactly one unit of both A and B, but also
includes 1 unit of a third good, Y. Assume that Y is
produced by both the monopolist and its B-market rivals.
The standalone price of Y is $10, while its production cost is
$6. Products A and B are sold separately for $10 each, and
production costs are $5 for A and $7 for B. The monopolist
sells individual units of A and also the A-B-Y bundle, which
it discounts by 20% for a bundled price of $24. If we apply
the ICT, we see that the bundle’s incremental cost over good
A is $13, while its incremental price is $14. Hence, the ICT
is passed and the bundle is granted safe harbor. This stands
in contrast to the A-B bundle presented in the last section,
which failed the ICT. To generalize, the addition of goods to
the bundle that both the dominant firm and the rival
produce makes exclusion less likely, provided the discount
factor is unchanged. 23
Alternatively, suppose we add a third good X to the A-B
bundle, but assume that the rival does not produce X. Good
X has a price of $10 and a cost of $6; that is, it is identical to
good Y in price and cost. As before, A and B are sold for $10
each, and have costs of $5 and $7 respectively. As with the
A-B-Y bundle, the 20% discount applied to the A-B-X bundle
results in a bundled price of $24. However, unlike the
preceding case, the ICT now measures incremental prices
and costs with respect to both A and X, as these constitute
the primary component of the bundle in this case (i.e., the
component not produced by the rival). The bundle’s
incremental price is $4, while its incremental cost is $7, so
that the A-B-X bundle fails the ICT. Hence, the addition of
good X to the A-B bundle has the reverse effect obtained by
the addition of good Y. In general, the addition of goods not

22. See supra Part II.A.
23. See infra apps. 2-3.
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produced by a rival makes exclusion of that rival more
likely, provided the discount factor is unchanged. 24
The two examples simply illustrate the proposition that
in order for the rival to compete with an “incomplete”
bundle it must apply a series of price cuts to the bundled
goods it can produce. As the number of bundled goods not
produced by the rival increases, the rival is forced to employ
larger price cuts on the ones that it does produce in order to
compete. Put differently, excluding a rival is easier when a
bundle includes more goods that the rival cannot produce.
By contrast, the addition of goods that are produced by both
the bundling firm and the rival makes exclusion less likely,
as the rival can compete with the bundle using relatively
smaller price cuts. 25
The addition of the third good (X or Y) into the bundle
has a differential impact on rivals depending on whether
they also sell the third good. If they do, exclusion becomes
relatively more difficult. If they do not, exclusion becomes
relatively easier. As a result, the addition of another good to
a bundle may benefit one rival, who makes the third good,
but it may burden or even exclude a different rival who does
not make the third good. One important corollary of this
observation is that the rival can compete more easily by
adding additional goods to the bundle, whether or not they
are the dominant firm’s monopolized goods.
Thus, for example, suppose a bundle offered by the
dominant firm aggregates discounts across 5 products, A, B,
C, D, and E. Ceteris paribus, the more of these products that
the rival produces, the more easily it will be able to match
the discount. This also means that if many rivals compete
with the dominant firm, their individual ability to compete
will depend greatly on how many and which of the goods in
the bundle they produce. A firm that produces goods B, C,
D, and E will be able to compete more readily than a rival
that produces only C, D, and E. When proportions of the
24. It should be noted that a bundled good need not be a “monopoly good” in
order to make competing with the bundle more difficult for rivals in a secondary
market. Rather, any bundled good that is not produced by those rivals makes
competing with the bundle more difficult, regardless of whether or not that
good’s production is unique to the bundling firm. For a more detailed
explanation, see infra apps. 1-3.
25. For an explanation and proof of how various aspects of a bundle
contribute to its potential for exclusion, see infra apps. 1-3.
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goods in the bundle can be varied at the request of the
customer, the analysis becomes even more complex. 26
To simplify discussion, we offer some terminology to
help identify the significant components of a bundle. These
must be relativized to a particular rival because, as the last
paragraph illustrates, different rivals may be impacted in
different ways. For a given rival, we say that a bundled
good is a competing good if the rival has the ability to
produce that good. Conversely, we say that a bundled good
is an excluding good for a particular rival if that rival does
not (and perhaps cannot) produce that good. Accordingly, we
define a rival’s competing share of a bundle to be the set of
all bundled units of that rival’s competing goods. Likewise,
a rival’s excluding share of a bundle is the set of all bundled
units of that rival’s excluding goods. 27 Importantly, these
shares must be computed for each particular rival—we
cannot merely look at the shares produced by the dominant
firm, or defendant, as is typically done in antitrust analysis.
We can think of these shares as undiscounted baskets of
goods, the quantities of which are the same as they are
within the discounted bundle. A rival’s competing share, for
instance, includes all of the rival’s competing goods, and at
the same quantities in which they appear within the
discounted bundle. For example, suppose a bundle includes
3 units of A, 2 units of B, and 1 unit of Y. Assume that a
rival produces only B and Y. Then B and Y are competing
goods for the rival, while A is the only excluding good.
Likewise, the rival’s competing share consists of 2 units of B
and 1 unit of Y, while its excluding share consists of 3 units
of A. Hence, we see that for any rival, the union of both
shares observed by that rival is equivalent to the entire
contents of the bundle.
With these definitions, it is easier to describe the steps
that a rival must take in order to compete with a bundle.
Our preceding examples 28 that considered bundles of three
goods demonstrate how a rival’s competing and excluding
shares of the bundle work against one another. In
particular, a rival must amortize over its own output the
nominal value of the dominant firm’s discount in order to
26. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
27. See infra apps. 1-2.
28. See supra Part II.A.
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compete with it. To do this, the rival must attribute a series
of price cuts to its competing goods so that the undiscounted
value of its competing share falls by an amount no less than
the bundle’s nominal discount. Intuitively, this just says
that the rival must eliminate the discount provided by the
bundle, which it accomplishes by reducing the prices of one
or more competing goods.
To see how a bundle’s impact may vary among rivals,
consider another example. Suppose a firm produces a
bundle that consists of 1 unit of each of the goods A1, A2,
and A3, in addition to 2 units of B1 and 1 unit of B2. Hence
the bundle includes 6 units of 5 different goods. Rival 1 sells
only B1, rival 2 sells only B2, and the bundling firm sells
only the bundle and individual units of the 3 A-goods. For
simplicity, assume that each of the 5 goods in the bundle is
priced at $10 and costs $6 to produce. The bundling firm
offers a 10% discount on the full bundle, so the price of the
bundle is $54. With this, we will first consider the bundle
from the perspective of rival 1. According to the definitions
given above, 2 units of B1 comprise the competing share of
this bundle for rival 1, while its excluding share includes 1
unit of each of the goods A1, A2, A3, and B2. It should be
noted that a rival’s excluding and competing shares are
analogous to the primary and secondary goods (respectively)
that characterized our examples of bundled pairs. Hence,
we apply the ICT by measuring incremental prices and
costs with respect to this rival’s excluding share.
Specifically, the bundle’s incremental price is the bundle’s
price less the market price of rival 1’s excluding share, $14.
The bundle’s incremental cost is therefore the cost of the
bundle less the cost of rival 1’s excluding share, $12. Hence,
the ICT is passed with respect to rival 1. If we consider the
bundle from the perspective of rival 2, our results change.
To begin, we note that rival 2’s competing share is 1 unit of
B2, while its excluding share is 1 unit of each of the goods
A1, A2, and A3, as well as 2 units of B1. If we use the same
process to apply the ICT using rival 2’s bundle shares, we
find an incremental price and cost of $4 and $6 respectively.
Thus, the ICT is failed with respect to rival 2.
This example, as well as previous ones, 29 illustrates a
number of important implications. First, a bundle’s
29. See supra Part II.A.
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exclusionary potential 30 can differ significantly from one
rival to the next. This can be seen in the two different
outcomes that resulted when we applied the ICT to two
different rivals. This demonstrates that the bundle is
exclusionary within the market for B2, but not within the
market for B1. Second, bundled goods produced exclusively
by the bundling firm are not the only sort that can
contribute to a bundle’s exclusionary potential. Rather, any
bundled good not produced by a particular rival contributes
to the bundle’s potential to harm or exclude that rival, even
if the good is produced by one or more other rivals. Indeed,
the excluding share of each rival in our example included a
good produced by the other rival. Hence, we see that not
only so-called “monopoly goods” can contribute to a bundle’s
exclusionary potential. In fact, if a bundle consists of only
competitively-sold goods and if a rival produces only a small
subset of those goods, then we have no reason to believe this
bundle has any less exclusionary potential than one
dominated by monopoly goods.
A bundled discount can injure a rival even if the
bundling strategy is undeniably pro-competitive. In
particular, a rival who produces only 1 of the goods within a
large bundle may be completely excluded regardless of how
competitive the goods in the bundle are. Suppose a bundle
includes 1 unit each of 10 different goods, but the rival
produces only 1 of those 10 goods. Because the rival’s
excluding share is so much larger than its competing share,
the rival likely cannot compete with the bundle at any price,
above cost or not. However, this would be true even if many
other rivals produced the full range of bundled goods, in
which case predation would not be a viable strategy. Often,
exclusion of a single firm rival (or rival who makes only a
subset of goods in a bundle) results from nothing more than
price competition among other rivals who make either the
full range, or at least a larger range, of goods in the
bundle. 31
The excluding share of a bundle contributes to its
potential for harm, while the competing share detracts from
30. A bundle’s “potential for harm” is simply the extent to which rivals are
obliged to cut prices in order to compete with the bundle. This is an ordinal
notion, as we can only use it to make comparisons among bundles.
31. For example, if 10 firms produce goods A, B, C, D, and E, all of which are
priced close to cost and offer even a modest bundled discount, the firm that
produces only one of these goods will be unable to compete.
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it. But we have still not determined what specific
characteristics of these shares actually yield harmful effects
or how we can use these characteristics to evaluate the
competitive effects of bundled discounting. In general, the
potential of a bundle to harm or exclude a rival increases as
the undiscounted value of that rival’s excluding share grows
larger. Conversely, this exclusionary potential decreases as
the total number of bundled units (as opposed to goods) in
the rival’s competing share is increased. 32 That is because a
rival’s competing and excluding shares have opposing
effects on a bundle’s potential to harm that rival. In fact, a
rival’s competing share of a bundle is analogous to good B in
the simple case of bundled pairs, while its excluding share
is analogous to good A. Additionally, a bundle’s potential to
harm a particular rival will tend to increase as the value of
the discount provided by the bundle increases. In general, a
bundle’s potential to harm or exclude a given rival will
increase as:
• the number of excluding goods facing the rival
increases;
• the bundled quantities of 1 or more of the rival’s
excluding goods increase;
• the prices of 1 or more of the rival’s excluding goods
increase;
• the number of competing goods facing the rival
decreases;
• the bundled quantities of 1 or more of the rival’s
competing goods decrease;
• the profit margins of 1 or more of the rival’s
competing goods decrease;
• or the discount provided by the bundle (in terms of
markdown percentage) increases, ceteris paribus.33
One important implication is that if a dominant firm
makes a large product line and a rival only a very small one,
then relatively small bundled discounts can exclude. For
example, suppose that the dominant firm makes 10
products that cost $9 each and sell individually for $10
each, but offers a 2% discount to those who take a full set,
resulting in a price of $98. The rival makes only product
32. For a proof, see infra app. 2.
33. See infra app. 2.
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number 10, which it can sell to the customer for $9, but
then the customer will have to pay $90 for the other 9
products from the dominant firm, for a total of $99. The
bundle flunks the attribution test and the ICT. Indeed, in
this particular example any discount above 1% will exclude
the rival from the trade of those customers who want the
entire package; but such trivial discounts are almost
certainly justified by cost savings in contracting or delivery,
if not in production.
This brings us back to our earlier observation about the
definition of an equally efficient firm. 34 When a multiproduct firm enters the market, any multi-product cost
savings can justify a multi-product discount. This includes
transaction and transportation cost savings as well as strict
production cost savings. Indeed, for a multi-product firm not
to have any scope economies would be exceptional. All it
takes is one input or production process whose costs can be
distributed over multiple goods. In these cases, the discount
is merely a mechanism by which these cost savings can be
passed on to consumers.
Finally, our results imply that if the profit margins of a
rival’s competing goods are relatively small, then the bundle
is more likely to fail the attribution test with respect to that
rival. This produces the ironic result that the less monopoly
power a bundling firm has in the markets for a rival’s
competing goods, the more likely its bundle will fail the test.
That is, as the market price of the competing good
approaches marginal cost, a smaller discount is needed to
exclude. 35 On the other hand, the profit margins of a rival’s
excluding goods will generally not impact the bundle’s
potential to exclude that rival. For example, suppose a
bundle includes 1 unit each of the 3 goods, A, B, and C, and
a rival produces only the goods B and C. Assume that each
good has a price of $10, and that the bundle offers a 20%
discount, yielding a bundled price of $24. First, suppose that
production costs are $6 for all 3 goods. Then, measured with
respect to this rival’s excluding share, a single unit of A, the
bundle’s incremental price and cost are $14 and $12
respectively. Hence, the attribution test is passed. Now,
34. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
35. For example, if the dominant firm is an A good monopolist and the B good
is sold in a perfectly competitive market at a price equal to marginal cost, then
any discount on an A-B package could exclude the rival.
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suppose that B and C each cost $9 to produce. In this case,
the bundle’s incremental price is still $14, but its
incremental cost is $18, so the attribution test is failed. This
is because the rival’s competing goods now have much
smaller profit margins, severely limiting its ability to cut
prices and compete with the bundle. Moreover, this is true
regardless of what profit margin is observed by the rival’s
excluding goods. Indeed, if the cost of producing A were $0,
or even $10, our results would not change.
The implications should not be lost—the more
competitive the markets of a rival’s competing goods are to
begin with, the easier it will be for a rival to prove exclusion
under the prevailing antitrust tests. This leads to the
perverse result that the tests tend to show more positive
results as monopolization in the competing good markets
becomes less likely.
B. Joint Offers by Rivals
Even if no rival produces the full range of bundled
goods, predatory bundling may not be a viable strategy.
Specifically, if 2 or more rivals can collectively produce all or
most of the goods within a bundle, then exclusion may not
be possible. For example, suppose a bundle includes 1 unit
each of the 3 goods X, Y, and Z. Rival 1 produces only good
X, rival 2 produces only good Y, and rival 3 produces only
good Z. All goods have individual prices and costs of $10 and
$6, respectively. Finally, assume the bundle offers a 20%
discount, which yields a bundled price of $24. For any one of
the three rivals, the bundle’s incremental price is $4, while
its incremental cost is $6. Hence, the ICT is failed with
respect to each rival. However, because the rivals
collectively produce the contents of the bundle, the
exclusion of any rival is not generally possible, provided
each rival has an incentive to compete with the bundle.
Indeed, each rival could reduce the price of its only
competing good to $8, which still leaves a $2 markup. This
effectively eliminates the discount provided by the bundle,
as its contents can now be bought separately for the same
price at which the bundle is sold.
In fact, even if rivals collectively produce only a subset
of the goods within the bundle, exclusion is unlikely if that
subset is sufficiently large. We could remove rival one from
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our previous example, 36 so that the two remaining rivals
collectively produce only goods Y and Z. In this case, the two
rivals can price their respective competing goods at $7,
which still allows them to compete with the bundle at
above-cost prices. To generalize, exclusion is not likely to
occur if some combination of rivals can collectively produce
all or even most of the goods within the bundle—the larger
the number of the goods in the dominant firm’s bundle they
can offer, the less likely they will be excluded.
Note, however, that if the dominant firm offers a bundle
subject to joint costs or economies of scope, then rivals will
not be able to join forces and compete by offering the larger
bundle unless they can also attain the joint cost savings. If
A and B can be produced more cheaply together than
separately, a firm that produces A alone and one that
produces B alone will not attain the cost savings simply
because they bundle their separately produced A and B
together; they would have to engage in actual joint
production. 37
C. Variable Proportion Bundles
In a variable proportion bundle, the discount rate and
the set of bundled goods are predetermined by the bundling
firm, but the bundled quantities of those goods are
subjectively chosen by consumers. The competitive effects of
variable proportion bundling change as the proportions of
bundled goods are varied.
When bundling occurs on a very large scale, it becomes
more difficult for purchasers to predetermine the contents of
bundles. Indeed, as the set of bundled goods and their
respective quantities become more diverse, the bundle
appeals to a more specific subset of consumers. In such
cases, the sellers have every incentive to give buyers
considerable freedom in choosing the bundle’s contents. For
example, a medical device manufacturer may offer a 10%
discount to hospitals that purchase a minimum specified
share of their needs of 5 different products from the
manufacturer; however, the precise amount that they
36.

See supra Part II.B.

37. On the significance of joint costs, or cost savings that accrue to production
or distribution of the bundle, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1 at
525-28.
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purchase during the contract period will depend on patient
demand, and the proportions sold under the same contract
could vary from one purchaser to another. Indeed, it would
almost certainly be impossible to negotiate a single contract
with a large number of purchasers if all purchasers were
required to take the goods in the bundle in the same
proportion. 38
To see how varying the proportions of bundled goods
impact a bundle’s competitive effects, reconsider our
example from the first section. 39 Once again, assume that a
primary good A costs $5 to produce, while a secondary good
B costs $7 to produce. Both goods sell for individual prices of
$10. The monopolist offers a 20% discount on a bundle that
includes 1 unit of both A and B, yielding a bundled price of
$16. A rival sells only B. As before, this bundle flunks both
the attribution test and the ICT. In order for a rival who
makes only B to compete, it would have to charge $6 for B,
which is $1 less than its costs.
However, suppose that the bundle contains 1 unit of A
and 3 units of B. As before, the bundle offers a 20%
discount, so that its price is $32. To apply the attribution
test we attribute the entire $8 discount to the 3 units of B,
which results in $22. This is the maximum price that the
rival, who makes only the B, can charge for the 3 units.
Since B costs $7 to produce, the rival can sell the 3 units
and have $1 left over; the bundle passes the AMC’s
attribution test. Alternatively, to apply the ICT, we compare
the bundle’s incremental cost (over the single unit of A) 40 to
its incremental price. Because we assume there are no joint
cost savings, the incremental cost is simply 3 times the cost
of B, or $21, while the incremental price is the price of the
bundle less the price of A, or $22. Hence, the incremental
price of the bundle exceeds its incremental cost, and so the
bundle with the 1 to 3 ratio of A to B warrants safe harbor.
A pass of the attribution test always guarantees a pass of
the ICT, whether or not any cost savings result from jointly

38. In general, a bundle tends to exclude rivals less as it contains more of the
competitive product in relation to the monopoly product. See infra app. 2.
39. See supra Part I.
40. In general, we use the set of all bundled goods not produced by rivals as
the basis for measuring its incremental prices and costs (i.e., if this bundle
contained X units of A, then we would use X times the price of A as this basis).
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producing the contents of the bundle. 41 In sum, changing the
proportions of goods in the bundle will affect its
exclusionary potential. For that reason, as the proportion of
a rival’s competing goods in the bundle increases, the
bundle becomes less likely to fail either the AMC’s
attribution test or the ICT.
This fact has a number of implications. First, as a
matter of analysis, one can never apply the attribution test
or ICT over products in a 1 to 1 ratio if the customers in fact
were offered or actually purchased a different ratio. Second,
if the goods in the bundle are partial substitutes, a
customer can avoid the bundle by purchasing relatively
more of the competitive good. Third, the foreclosure story
can become much more complex in circumstances where
different customers take significantly different proportions
of bundled goods. As a matter of antitrust, exclusion is
measured by calculating the portion of the relevant market
from which a rival is excluded. In effect, one asks what
portion of the aggregate sales of a rival’s competing good(s)
consisted of bundles with which that rival could not
compete. But when bundles are sold in varied proportions,
simply aggregating the sales does not work. Consider a
simple example of variable proportion bundling where
aggregate sales would indicate a larger degree of harm than
actually occurred.
Suppose a dominant firm engages in variable proportion
bundling of the two goods A and B. As in previous
illustrations, both A and B have individual prices of $10,
while production costs are $5 for A and $7 for B. A rival
produces only B. The bundling firm offers a 20% on bundled
sales, regardless of what quantities appear in a consumer’s
bundle. For simplicity, we will assume there are only two
types of buyers in this setting. Type 1 consumers want
bundles with 4 units of A and 1 unit of B. Type 2 consumers
want bundles with 1 unit of A and 4 units of B. We will refer
to these two bundles as bundle 1 and bundle 2 respectively,
—both of which have a bundled price of $40.
Bundle 1, which has 4 units of A and 1 unit of B, is
exclusionary. The rival’s excluding share of bundle 1
consists of 4 units of A, so the incremental price and cost of
41. See infra app. 3.
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bundle 1 are $0 and $7 respectively. In any instance where
the incremental price of a bundle is non-positive, the rival
will not be able to compete with it, provided production
costs are above zero. Conversely, bundle 2 earns safe harbor
with relative ease. In this case, the rival’s excluding share is
a single unit of A, so bundle 2 has an incremental price and
cost of $30 and $28 respectively. Hence, the rival is excluded
from competing for type 1 consumers, but not type 2
consumers.
The fact that all the bundles being purchased are not
exclusionary is significant when considering the aggregate
sales that take place in this market. Suppose that after
serving all consumers of both types, the bundling firm has
aggregate sales consisting of 100 units of A and 100 units of
B. If we apply the attribution test to the aggregate sales
made by the bundling firm, the attribution test is failed.
Specifically, we could treat these sales as one large bundle,
which would have a net price of $1600. Hence, this bundle
would provide a nominal discount of $400 which, when
attributed to the 100 units of B, would require that each
unit of B be sold for a price of $6 if the rival is to compete.
This is below the cost of producing B, so the aggregate sales
of the bundling firm would indeed be exclusionary if they
were in fact sold in the same proportions. However, we
know that this is not actually the case. Rather, bundles
were sold in two different proportions, only one of which
was exclusionary.
For example, suppose the bundling firm’s aggregate
sales were comprised of 20 sales of both bundles 1 and 2. Or,
to say this differently, the bundling firm served 20
consumers of each type. This would result in aggregate
sales of 100 units of A and 100 units of B, as hypothesized
earlier. However, of the 100 units of B sold by the bundling
firm, only 20 were sold as a part of bundle 1—the only
exclusionary bundle sold in the market. Hence, the rival
was excluded from only 20% of these sales, as it could have
set prices that would have permitted it to compete with
bundle 2. By examining market shares, we can determine
from what portion of the overall market for B the rival was
foreclosed. For example, if bundled sales of B constitute 50%
of the overall market for B, and if the rival is foreclosed
from only 20% of those sales, then the rival is foreclosed
from only 10% of the overall market for B. So, while
examining only the aggregate result of bundled sales would
suggest the rival has been foreclosed from all bundled sales
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and hence 50% of the overall market it has in fact been
foreclosed from a much smaller portion of that market.
This result is particularly important when assessing, for
example, class action suits in which the plaintiffs are rival
producers of bundled goods. Clearly, aggregate sales are not
a reflection of the market-wide exclusion that actually took
place. We can assess the exclusionary impact of the
bundling strategy only by examining the specific contents of
the various bundles. This also implies that even if 1 rival
has a legitimate claim of unreasonable exclusion, a different
rival may not. If the bundles being sold contained more than
2 goods, then different rivals would be affected differently
depending on what bundled goods they can produce. For
example, suppose that all bundles sold in the preceding
example also included 1 unit of C, which has a price and
cost of $10 and $6 respectively. Hence, both bundles would
have a price of $48, and both would fail the attribution test
with respect to a rival that produces only C. In that case,
the rival is foreclosed from all bundled sales of good C. If we
assume that bundled sales constitute 50% of the total sales
of C, then this rival would be foreclosed from 50% of the
overall market for C. In this way, we see that it is not
generally possible to infer a bundle’s potential to exclude 1
rival by examining its effect on a different rival. Likewise,
we cannot examine aggregate sales to determine the
exclusionary force of a variable proportion bundling
strategy.
In sum, the exclusionary power of the bundle
diminishes, perhaps dramatically, as individual customers
are able to make different substitution decisions. This is
particularly significant if the goods in the bundle are partial
substitutes. If A is a monopolized good and B is a
competitive good, a customer will have an incentive to use
relatively more of B and relatively less of A and can avoid
purchasing the dominant firm’s bundle simply by changing
its proportions in favor of B. For example, hospital group
purchasing contracts for medical devices, such as
hypodermic needles or catheters, may include within the
bundle goods that are differentiated, but nevertheless have
many common uses. The purchaser may be able to avoid the
monopolist for purchase of the competitive good simply by
purchasing more of that good in relation to the monopolized
good. As the A and B good are closer substitutes for each
other, customers will find it easier to take relatively more of
B and relatively less of A.
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In contrast to substitutability, complementarity among
the goods in the bundle has a different effect. For example,
if a monopolist offers a bundle that cannot be matched by
rivals and yet there remains a large number of consumers
who only want one of the goods, then significant harm is
unlikely to occur. Conversely, if A and B are uniformly
consumed together, then a bundle containing a relatively
large amount of the A good may prove fatal for competitors.
The greater the extent to which the goods in a bundle are
complements, meaning that the consumer uses all of them
together, the greater the exclusionary power of the bundled
discount.
However, complementarity must be perceived by a large
portion of consumers if harm is to occur. Trivially, a bundle
threatens rival producers of a bundled good only insofar as
the rival’s customers desire the remaining contents of the
bundle. Many instances of bundled discounts might be procompetitive, despite the fact that they fail the ICT, for the
simple reason that plenty of customers exist who do not
want all of the goods in the bundle. In fact, when a bundle is
sufficiently specialized to prevent losing unbundled sales,
the bundling strategy can be profitable no matter how small
its profit margin is. That is, if a bundle appeals to a much
different group of consumers than does its primary product
alone, then a failure of the attribution test is not suspicious
in the least. Indeed, if the bundling firm can ensure that
customers who buy only the primary good will not revert to
the less-profitable bundle, then the bundling strategy will
increase total profits no matter how slight the bundle’s
margin is. In these cases, the bundle serves as little more
than an independent compromise between a reduced profit
margin and additional sales.
D. Price Discrimination
Bundled pricing can often be used to facilitate price
discrimination, which occurs when a seller obtains different
returns on different groupings of sale. 42 Price discrimination
42. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 528-29; see also AMC
REPORT, supra note 14, at 398-99; DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL WALDMAN,
SAFE HARBORS FOR QUANTITY DISCOUNTS AND BUNDLING (2008), at EAG 08-1,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/230712.htm.
For a more
technical treatment of price discrimination strategies, see DENNIS W. CARLTON &
JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 324-30 (4th ed. 2005).
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of one type can occur when producers predetermine the
ratio of goods in a bundle. Such bundling is generally used
to attract consumers who place relatively less value on a
particular bundled good or who require a relatively
uncommon combination of related goods. Specifically, the
bundling firm charges these consumers different prices by
bundling different combinations of goods that appeal to
their respective demands. This also protects the bundling
firm from arbitrage, as these bundles typically include
particular goods or quantities that appeal only to the
consumers for whom they were intended. For example,
suppose a firm produces an electric drill that strongly
appeals to “light users,” who need it only for sporadic
household repairs. However, the drill attracts only a small
number of “heavy users,” who require near daily use of
electric drills. In order to better reach these consumers, the
drill producer might decide to offer a discounted bundle
whose contents appeal to heavy users. For example, the
bundle might include a large number of industrial drill bits,
which are typically sold in a competitive market. It would
offer a large discount on the bundle, as heavy users place
less value on the drill itself. As a result, the bundle would
likely be less profitable than the drill sold individually. But,
in exchange, the drill producer acquires many customers
who would otherwise buy a different drill. More
importantly, it does not lose standalone sales of the drill,
because the bundle includes far more of the heavier bits
than are required by light users. Hence, total profits could
easily increase, even if the bundle’s incremental cost
exceeds its incremental price. In this way, the bundle is
used to reach a specific group of consumers who place
relatively less value on the drill itself and who can be
uniquely targeted with a highly specific bundle. What is
more, the drill producer accomplishes this without having to
cut the drill’s standalone price. 43 When price discrimination
43. For example, suppose light users value the drill at $22 and heavy users at
$18 because they prefer a more heavy duty alternative. The drill has a
standalone price of $20, which includes a $5 markup. A package of heavy duty
bits has a price of $10, which includes a $1 markup. With little use for the heavy
drill bits, light users value this package at only $4 and would not purchase it in
a competitive market. But heavy users, who require the bits every day, value
the package at $12. The firm bundles the drill and the bits at a price of $28,
which is valued at $30 by heavy users, but only $26 by light users. Hence, heavy
users buy the bundle and light users buy the drill individually. Moreover, the
manufacturer earns good profits either way.
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works in this fashion, it increases the manufacturer’s sales
in some portion of the market. Further, since the sales are
profitable, the strategy does not require the exclusion of any
rival. As with all output increasing practices, however,
exclusion of a rival might result.
As is well known, price discrimination can also be
facilitated by variable proportion ties, 44 and bundled
discounts might serve as a substitute for a tie. For example,
the owner of a printer monopoly might sell the printer at
cost, but require the customer to purchase ink cartridges at
monopoly prices. In that case, the seller’s return on any
particular customer’s print/cartridge combination will be
higher as the customer uses more cartridges.
But variable proportion bundled discounts may not
work as effectively as variable proportion ties. As the
preceding discussion suggests, as the ratio of competitive
units (the cartridges) to monopolized units (the printer)
increases, it becomes less likely that the bundle will flunk
the attribution test. 45 As a result, competition would be
relatively easier for rival ink producers. This implies that
high-volume customers will very likely be able to forego the
discount on the printer and then purchase their cartridges
at a lower price in a competitive market. So, the strategy
loses the very customers from whom the higher rate of
return would be expected.
CONCLUSION
Bundling practices are extremely diverse and their
impact must be evaluated individually. The type of multiproduct bundling most likely to cause harm is that which
was at issue in LePage’s, where the defendant offered
evidently custom-made bundles to different large customers
in order to get them to drop the plaintiff’s line of cellophane
tape. 46 The kind that is least likely to cause harm occurs
when the seller has a single contract calling for discounts
44. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1711
(2d ed. 2004); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6e (3d ed. 2005).
45. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
46. LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (describing
individually targeted discount schemes linked to customers’ cessation of
purchases of plaintiff’s tape).
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aggregated across a large number of products and sold to
numerous customers. Harm is less likely as customers are
able to vary the proportion of goods in the bundle or
substitute one good for another, or as rivals produce the
same good(s) that the allegedly excluded firm produces,
even if the rivals do not produce a full line. When nearly all
consumers want a diverse bundle of some variety of goods,
but the desired contents of those bundles differ among
buyers, bundling plays a larger role than simply to serve the
rarified interests of a few. Specifically, it works both to pass
on to consumers the cost savings observed by large-scale
buyers or producers and to reduce transaction costs. Much
of these savings can then be passed down to customers, who
also avoid the many transactions that would be necessary
without multi-product purchasing contracts.
True anticompetitive exclusion by means of bundled
discounts is undoubtedly a rarity. Most of all, our analysis
shows that the Antitrust Commission’s “attribution” test,
which we have modified as an incremental cost test, is a
useful safe harbor for recognizing bundled discounts that
cannot exclude an equally efficient rival. However, the test
produces very severe false positives and should be regarded
as nothing more than a starting point for analysis. As the
number of goods in a bundle increases and as undiscounted
prices move closer to cost, the extent of false positives
increases as well.
APPENDICES
The arguments made in the appendices rely on the
general methods and notations introduced in Appendix 1.
We attempt to model the practice of bundled discounting in
the most general possible context. We will then be able to
draw several important conclusions regarding this practice
and also evaluate the cost-based tests currently used to
assess its competitive effects.
The analysis presented below is not intended to
evaluate the competing strategies employed by bundling
firms and their rivals. The objects of this analysis are not
the firms or agents that engage in bundled discounting, but
rather the bundles themselves. We seek to provide a means
of assessing a given bundle’s potential for harm which, upon
comparison to the strategy’s overall profitability will allow
for more educated assessments of a bundle’s propriety.
Indeed, to merit antitrust intervention, the courts require
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not only that a bundle excludes, but that it is in fact
“unreasonably exclusionary,” or designed with only that
purpose in mind.
Appendix 1: The Model
To begin, we will characterize the competitive
environment hypothesized by the model. Let X = {𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,…,
𝑥𝑥N} denote a discrete set of N different goods. We will
consider bundles over this set, though a bundle need not
include every good therein. Rather, we assume only that
every bundle contains at least two elements of X in positive
quantities.
We will rely on a cost vector of the form C = (C1, C2,…,
CN) ∊ (0, ∞) N, which is observed by all firms. Explicitly, for
all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, C𝑖𝑖 gives the marginal cost of producing 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.
Likewise, X admits a price vector P ∊ (0, ∞)N, which is of the
form P = (P1, P2,…, PN). These define standalone prices, so
that, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, P𝑖𝑖 gives the price of an individual
unit of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. We will assume that no goods in X are priced
below cost, so that ≥
P C. Also, we will assume that no
bundle is priced below the aggregate cost of its contents, as
this would effectively constitute an instance of predatory
pricing, which is not within the scope of this paper.
We will characterize bundles as vectors of the form γ =
Qγ⨉{βγ} ∊ [0, ∞) N × (0, 1), where Qγ = (q1(γ), q2(γ),…, qN(γ))
defines the bundled quantities of each good in X, and βγ
denotes the discount factor employed by γ. Each bundle has
a component that defines its own discount factor because
variations in these factors can lead to further variations in
the competitive effects of those bundles. As such, it is best to
consider two bundles with identical contents and different
discount factors as two distinct possibilities. With this, we
can define a correspondence whose values define the sets of
all possible discounted bundles, given prices and costs.
Definition 1.1: Let X, C, and P be as defined above. Then
the following correspondence defines the sets of all possible
discounted bundles over X:
Γ(X, C, P) = { γ = Qγ⨉{βγ} ∊ [0, ∞)N × (0, 1) | Qγ∙C ≤ Qγ∙βγP ;
∃𝑖𝑖,∊ {1,2,…,N}, 𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗, with q𝑖𝑖(γ),
q𝑗𝑗(γ) > 0}
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Where q(γ) denotes the 𝑖𝑖th component of Qγ, which gives the
bundled quantity of the good 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N. It should
be noted that a bundle’s price is given by Qγ∙βγP. With these
things in mind, we can go on to present several definitions
that will be important in later sections.
Definition 1.2: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P). We let S(γ) ⊆ X denote
the support of γ, or the set of all goods in X with positive
bundled quantities. Explicitly, S(γ) = ⋃N𝑖𝑖=1{ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ X | q𝑖𝑖 (γ) >
0 }.

Definition 1.3: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a firm that
sells only individual units of goods in X. We will let Y(R) ⊆
X denote the set of goods in X that R produces. Then we say
R is a rival of the bundling firm if and only if Y(R)⋂S(γ) ≠ ∅,
and we characterize R’s position relative to γ with the
following definitions:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

GC(γ; R) = Y(R)⋂S(γ) ∊ X defines the set of competing
goods observed by R.

GE(γ; R) = S(γ)∖Y(R) ∊ X defines the set of excluding
goods observed by R.
QC(γ; R) = (φ1(γ; R)q1(γ), φ2(γ; R)q2(γ),…, φN(γ;
R)qN(γ)) ∊ [0, ∞)N defines the competing share of γ
observed by R.

QE(γ; R) = ([1 –φ1(γ; R)]q1(γ), [1 –φ2(γ; R)]q2(γ),…, [1 –
φN(γ; R)]qN(γ)) ∊ [0, ∞) N defines the excluding share of
γ observed by R.
Where φi (γ; R) = �

1 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GC (γ; R)

0 otherwise

∀ 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , N.

Two obvious implications of these definition are that
GC(γ; R) + GE(γ; R) = S(γ) and QC(γ; R) + QE(γ; R) = Qγ, for
any rival R.
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Appendix 2: Competitive Effects
In the text, we often referred to a rival’s ability to
compete with a bundle. We said that in order to compete
with a bundle, a rival must price his competing goods so
that consumers can buy the contents of the bundle
separately for a net price no greater than the price of the
bundle. Before offering an explicit condition for this,
however, we will define the set of pricing strategies that
allow a rival to compete with a bundle. Specifically, we will
define the set of price cuts that (i) allow the rival to compete
with the bundle, and (ii) result in sustainable prices for all
competing goods observed by the rival. This will then allow
us to define a condition for competing with a bundle, which
will be given in terms of these price cuts.
Definition 2.1: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then
the following correspondence defines the set of all possible
combinations of price cuts K = (𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2,…, 𝑘𝑘N) that can be
implemented by R in order to compete with γ, and which
leave all competing goods priced no lower than cost:
PC(γ; R) = { K ∊ [0, ∞)N | 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ≤ P𝑖𝑖 − C𝑖𝑖 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GC(γ; R), 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N ;
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 0 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∉ GC(γ; R), 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N ;
QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P }

Where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 denotes the 𝑖𝑖th component K, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2,…,N.
The third condition stipulated by the price cut
correspondence ensures that the price cuts allow the rival to
compete with the bundle. To see how the condition was
formulated, we consider an equivalent inequality:
QC(γ; R)∙(P − K) + QE(γ; R)∙(P − K) ≤ Qγ∙βγP.
This says that, after the price cuts have been imposed,
consumers can afford to buy separately the competing and
excluding shares of the bundle for a net price no greater
than the bundle’s price. It should be noted that the price of
the bundle is still defined as Qγ∙βγP and not Qγ∙βγ(P − K),
because the price cuts apply to sales made by the rival and
not those of the bundling firm. This is the same premise
that underscores the cost-based tests used for granting safe
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harbor; it is the same definition of rival-bundle competition
that was provided in the text. Of course, the price cuts only
correspond to competing goods, so that we can simply the
condition as follows:
QC(γ; R)∙(P − K) + QE(γ; R)∙P ≤ Qγ∙βγP.
⟹ QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P.
As definition 2.1 indicates, the above inequality is a
necessary condition for any price cut combination that
permits R to compete with γ. The two remaining conditions
stipulate that (i) price cuts are attributed only to a rival’s
competing goods; and (ii) no competing goods are priced
below cost after the price cuts are imposed. An obvious
corollary of this definition is that a rival can compete with a
bundle without pricing any competing goods below cost if
and only if PC(γ; R) ≠ Ø.
By defining the set of price cuts sufficient for a rival to
compete with a bundle, we can identify how different
aspects of bundles contribute to their potential for harm. To
do this, we first note that a bundle can exclude a rival only
if that rival must resort to setting unsustainable in order to
compete with a bundle. To that end, we can characterize a
bundle’s potential for harming a rival by examining the
magnitude of the price cuts that allow said rival to compete.
This will allow us to determine what aspects of a bundle
contribute to its potential for harm.
Our first result will identify how various characteristics
of a bundle’s excluding share contribute to its potential for
harm. As the following proposition illustrates, this potential
is influenced by both the number and quantities of
excluding goods, as well as the bundle’s discount factor.
Proposition 2.2: Fix γ1, γ2 ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival
such that QC(γ1; R) = QC(γ2; R). Then ∀ K ∊ PC(γ1; R), ∃α ∊
(0, 1) such that αK ∊ PC(γ2; R) if any of the following
conditions are observed:
(I) βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R); QE(γ1; R) ≥ Q E(γ2; R); and
q𝑚𝑚(γ1) > q𝑚𝑚(γ2) for some excluding good 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 ∊ GE(γ1; R) =
GE(γ2; R), 𝑚𝑚 ∊ {1,2,…,N}.
(II) QE(γ1; R) = QE(γ2; R) and βγ1 < βγ2.
(III) βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ2; R) ⊊ GE(γ1; R); and q𝑖𝑖(γ1) = q𝑖𝑖(γ1) for all
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GE(γ2; R), 𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N.
Proof: Assume PC(γ1; R) ≠ Ø, and fix K ∊ PC(γ1; R).
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(Part I) Assume that βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R);
QE(γ1; R)≥ Q E(γ2; R); and q𝑚𝑚(γ1) > q𝑚𝑚(γ2) for some
excluding good 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 ∊ GE(γ1; R) = GE(γ2; R), 𝑚𝑚 ∊ {1,2,…,N}.

⟹ QC(γ1; R)∙K ≥ Qγ1∙(1 − βγ1)P

⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙K ≥ Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P > Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P.
Set α = [Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P]/[Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P] ∊ (0, 1).

⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ2)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P.

Moreover, K ∊ PC(γ1; R) implies that, ∀𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N: (i) α𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
= 0 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is not a competing good; and (ii) P𝑖𝑖 − α𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ≥ C𝑖𝑖 if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
is a competing good.

⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R).

(Part II) Assume that QE(γ1; R) = QE(γ2; R) and βγ1 < βγ2.
Set α = (1 − βγ2)/(1 − βγ1) ∊ (0, 1).

K ∊ PC(γ1; R) and QC(γ1; R) = QC(γ2; R) ⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK
≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ1)P, which likewise implies QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥
Qγ2∙α(1 − βγ1)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P.

⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R), by the same argument used in Part I.

(Part III) Assume that βγ1 = βγ2; GE(γ2; R) ⊊ GE(γ1; R);
and q𝑖𝑖(γ1) = q𝑖𝑖(γ2), for all excluding goods 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ GE(γ2; R),
𝑖𝑖=1,2,…N.
⟹ QC(γ1; R)∙K = Q C(γ2; R)∙K ≥ Q γ1∙(1 − βγ1)P = Qγ1∙(1 −
βγ2)P > Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P.

Set α = [Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P]/[Qγ1∙(1 − βγ2)P] ∊ (0, 1).

⟹ QC(γ2; R)∙αK ≥ Qγ1∙α(1 − βγ2)P = Qγ2∙(1 − βγ2)P.

⟹ αK ∊ PC(γ2; R), by the same argument used in Part I.
□.

This proof outlines conditions sufficient for reducing the
magnitude of any price cut combination that allows a rival
to compete with a bundle. It relies on the premise that if a
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rival can compete with one bundle using price cuts that are
strictly smaller than those required by a second bundle,
then the latter is more harmful than the former. In this
way, the preceding proof demonstrates that a bundle’s
potential for harm decreases as (i) the bundled quantities of
one or more excluding goods decrease; (ii) its discount factor
increases; or (iii) the number of excluding goods decreases,
ceteris paribus.
We can also say something about how the prices and
quantities of competing goods affect a bundle’s potential for
harm. As indicated in the text, in order to compete with a
bundle, a rival must make relatively larger price cuts as the
ratio of the excluding share’s value to the number of
competing units is increased.
Proposition 2.3: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and le t R be a rival.
Then, holding constant the ratio of the competing share’s
retail value to the number of competing bundled units, the
average price cut per bundled unit (of competing goods)
required for R to compete with γ is strictly increasing in the
ratio of the excluding share’s retail value to the number of
bundled units of competing goods, or [QE(γ; R)∙P]/[ Q C(γ;
R)∙{1}N].
Proof: Recall that QC(γ; R)∙K gives the sum of all price
cuts applied by a rival to competing units within the
bundle. We have previously shown that a rival can
compete with these price cuts if and only if the following
condition holds:
QC(γ; R)∙K ≥ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P.
Hence, the right hand side of this inequality defines the
smallest possible sum of all price cuts that are applied
to bundled units of competing goods, and which allow
the rival to compete with the bundle. Hence, on average,
the price of each bundled unit (of a competing good)
must fall by the following amount if the rival is to
compete:
μ𝑘𝑘 = [ Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P]/[ QC(γ; R)∙{1}N] = 1 − βγ ) �
Q E (γ;R)∙P

Q C (γ;R)∙{1}N

�

Q C (γ;R)∙P

Q C (γ;R)∙{1}N

+
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Written in this way, the desired result is trivial. μ𝑘𝑘 is
obviously growing in the ratio of the excluding share’s
value to the number of competing units (given by the
second bracketed term), ceteris paribus.
□.
Appendix 3: Cost-Based Tests for Safe Harbor
In previous cases of bundled discounting, the courts
have occasionally applied a cost-based test known as the
attribution test. In effect, the test determines whether an
equally efficient rival can afford to compete with a bundle
without pricing below cost. We can define this test so that it
is applicable to the general case of many different bundled
goods and quantities. However, to do this, it will be useful to
drop our previous assumption of constant marginal
production costs. Explicitly, if V ∊ [0, ∞)N is a bundle of
goods in X, where the 𝑖𝑖th component of V gives the quantity
of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,N, then we will let C(V) denote the cost
of jointly producing the bundle described by V. We will still
assume that all rivals are equally efficient producers of
competing goods, though they may not observe cost savings
that result from jointly producing competing and excluding
goods. Also, we will assume that firms minimize production
costs, so that C(V) denotes the cheapest possible cost of
producing the contents of V. This will be useful in
discussing certain cost irregularities (e.g., joint costs or
economies of scope), which may be observed only by the
bundling firm as a result of its larger range of outputs.
Definition 3.1: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then
γ passes the attribution test with respect to rival R if and
only if the following condition is met:
Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C[QC(γ; R)].
As discussed in the text, this test is effectively a
mechanism for determining whether a bundle is
exclusionary with respect to a particular rival. Recall that
we define a bundle to be exclusionary with respect to an
equally efficient rival if that rival must price one or more
competing goods below cost in order to compete with the
bundle. However, as we describe in the text, a bundle’s
failure of this test is not a strong indicator that the bundle
is predatory (i.e., that its overall profitability depends on
the exclusion of one or more rivals). Indeed, the test often
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yields failing grades to bundles that clearly merit safe
harbor. To correct this, we introduced an alternative test in
a previous paper that takes into account any efficiency
gains that may explain a firm’s decision to offer discounted
bundles. We call this test the incremental cost test, which
we will now define for the general case of many bundled
goods and quantities.
Definition 3.2: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. Then
γ passes the incremental cost test with respect to the rival R
if and only if the following condition is met:
Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].
The left hand side of this inequality measures the
incremental price of the bundle, measured with respect to
the excluding share observed by the rival R. Likewise, the
right hand side describes the bundle’s incremental cost.
Given our assumption that firms minimize production costs,
and given an equally efficient rival, we can show that a pass
of the attribution test implies a pass of the incremental cost.
However, the converse can be false under certain cost
conditions.
Proposition 3.3: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. If γ
passes the attribution test with respect to R, then it also
passes the incremental cost test with respect to R.
Proof: Assume that γ passes the attribution test with
respect to R.
⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C[QC(γ; R)].

Suppose C[QC(γ; R)] < C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].
⟹ C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] < C(Qγ), where QC(γ; R) +
QE(γ; R) = Qγ by definition.
This contradicts our assumption that firms minimize
production costs. That is, we define C(Qγ) to be the
lowest cost at which the contents of Qγ can be produced,
which cannot be the case if C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] <
C(Qγ).

⟹ C[QC(γ; R)] ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].

⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)].
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⟹ γ passes the incremental cost test with respect to R.
□.

Of course, the converse is not necessarily true. In the
text we give examples in which the bundling firm observes
cost savings (e.g., joint cost savings, economies of scope)
that can be passed down to consumers. Given explicitly, this
condition says that the bundling firm observes a cost
structure such that C(Qγ) < C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)]. Of
course, if a bundling firm takes advantage of these
efficiency gains, and if a large portion of the savings are
passed on to consumers, then the resulting prices may leave
rivals unable to compete. However, this is clearly not the
sort of exclusion that merits antitrust intervention. Indeed,
such strategies are often beneficial for both consumers and
the bundling firm, regardless of how rivals are impacted.
In the case that no savings result from jointly producing
the contents of a bundle, things become much simpler. In
fact, the attribution test and the incremental cost test are
actually equivalent in this case. To demonstrate this, we
offer the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P), and let R be a rival. If
no cost savings result from jointly producing the competing
and excluding shares of a bundle, then the attribution test
and the incremental cost test are identical with respect to R.
Proof: (⟹) In proposition 3.3, we showed that a pass of
the attribution test with respect to R implies a pass of
the incremental cost test with respect to R. This result
held without regard to cost savings resulting to joint
production. With this, we must now show that the
converse is also true, given our assumptions on costs.
(⟸) Assume that γ passes the incremental cost test
with respect to R, and that no cost savings result from
jointly producing the competing and excluding shares of
the bundle. Explicitly, this says:
C[QC(γ; R)] + C[QE(γ; R)] = C(Qγ).
⟹ Qγ∙βγP − QE(γ; R)∙P ≥ C(Qγ) − C[QE(γ; R)] = C[QC(γ; R)].

⟹ γ passes the attribution test with respect to R.
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⟹ Taken with respect to R, the attribution test and the
incremental cost test are equivalent when no cost
savings result from jointly producing the entire contents
of the bundle.
□.
In some cases it may be preferable to determine
whether a bundle is potentially exclusionary. That is, we
may want to determine whether a bundle meets the
necessary requirements for excluding any rival within the
markets for its component goods. To serve that purpose, we
offer the following definition, for which we will return to our
previous assumption of constant marginal costs.
Definition 3.5: Fix γ ∊ Γ(X, C, P). Then γ is potentially
exclusionary if the following condition is met:
∃ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∊ S(γ), 𝑖𝑖 ∊ {1,2,…,N}, such that q𝑖𝑖(γ)[P𝑖𝑖 − C𝑖𝑖] < Qγ∙(1 − βγ)P.

This condition says that the nominal value of the
discount provided by the bundle is greater than the summed
profits earned by all bundled units of one of its bundled
goods. This is equivalent to saying that the bundle would
fail the attribution test with respect to a rival who produced
only the good 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.
As indicated within the text, the incremental cost test
relies on the assumption that a bundle whose incremental
price (with respect to a rival’s excluding share) exceeds its
incremental cost is not predatory. By examining the
implications of passing the incremental cost test, we can see
why this assumption was made. To begin, we can restate
the condition stipulated by the incremental cost test, so that
we can see its implications regarding the bundle’s
profitability. By moving around the terms that comprise the
condition stipulated by the incremental cost test, we derive
following, equivalent condition:
Qγ∙βγP − C(Qγ) ≥ QE(γ; R)∙P − C[QE(γ; R)]
This says that the profits earned by the bundle are at
least as great as those earned by the excluding share alone.
If this is true, the likelihood that a bundle could be
predatory and yet still pass the incremental cost is very low.
Significantly, this could occur only if the bundling firm
observes significant savings from the joint production of the
bundle’s various elements. After all, if that were not the
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case, then the attribution test and incremental cost would
be equivalent, so that a pass of the incremental cost test
implies that the bundle is not exclusionary with respect to
the rival. That would imply that a rival could not be
excluded, which eliminates the strategy as a candidate for
predatory bundling. Of course, in the case that the bundling
firm does observe cost savings due to joint production, it is
difficult to see how such a bundle might be anticompetitive.
Indeed, in this case the bundling firm is effectively passing
its efficiency gains on to consumers in the form of a
discount. Moreover, the notion of ‘equal efficiency’ becomes
skewed or even inapplicable in these cases, as described
within the text. When a rival is left in an untenable position
due to the innovations or efficiency gains of a competitor, it
will often be the case that those firms were equally efficient
before said innovation took place. But these efficiency gains
must surely be incentivized, particularly if they result in
discounted prices. And if the profitability of the innovated
product is no less or even greater than that of the preceding
one–even after the discount–then this tactic has all the
defining characteristics of a pro-competitive practice.
Finally, note that even a bundle that permits rivals to
compete at above-marginal-cost prices could serve as a
mechanism for exclusion. All that is necessary is that the
rival’s sales volume is reduced to such an extent that it
cannot cover its fixed costs, which can occur anytime the
demand for a good decreases. For these reasons, it seems
that the incremental cost test is largely successful in its
purpose, which is merely to distinguish those instances of
bundled discounting that are almost certainly not
predatory.

